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In each city there is another, an underground city, underneath of which there 
is an endless number of hidden cities that time reveals in the most unexpected 
ways. These underground cities are at once both the past and future; they are 
all that no longer exists or does not yet exist in the present.1 
Since religions are one of the most important culture-constructing factors they -
especially the monotheistic ones - are often blamed for being sources and giving impetus to 
conflicts and hatred. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Beirut was a 
meeting point and a place of coexistence for the brightest intellectuals of the contemporary 
Arab world. It was a multiconfessional and thus multicultural city where the different 
groups managed to conduct the unrestrained development of their cultural and religious 
lives. The intellectuals of various confessions who created this unique and exemplary 
ambience used their respective religions as tools for building a common universe in which 
education and dialogue gave birth to fruitful cooperation and respect. 
In the Lebanese case - a country that has been divided between different religious 
denominations - historical research has so far not clarified the causes of the confessional 
system. Some historians explain its genesis as a genuine Lebanese tradition of power 
brokerage between clan-leaders, whereas others refer to the Ottoman millet system as the 
decisive factor of the confessional structure. Other historians take the influence of European 
conceptions and enforcement of foreign interests as being responsible for the development 
of such a system. Therefore, looking back may provide an idea to a later scholar of what 
could have been a potential, inherent, innate way of development for a given community. 
One has to take into account that Lebanon, historically as well as geopolitically, is a 
buffer state. Consequently, it acquired hybrid characteristics and developed the complex 
Lebanese paradox, the phenomenon we deal with today. As the Lebanese historian Kamal 
Salibi pointed out "the Lebanese society enjoyed the reputation for liberalism and tolerance, 
being traditional rather than zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards religion and political 
1 Review of Yesterday's Man by Tony Chakar, Rabih Mroué, Tiago Rodrigues. "A Portuguese man 
visits the town of Beirut year after year. (...) The city changes (...) at the mercy of time's erosion and 
history's convulsions. This man never changes, but lives different days at each visit - the days that 
the ever-changing city allows him to live." http://funzine.hu/200909283690/Culture/yesterdays-
man.html 
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ideology".2 Samir Khalaf supports this image stating that "Beirut with increasing 
urbanisation absorbed and assimilated successive waves of migrants and political refugees 
without any apparent degree of mass violence or urban strife".3 
Still, the confessionalist system in operation since 1926 has led to polarization, rather 
than the moderation of sectarian divides for it transforms differences which are not 
religious in and of themselves into religious conflicts. It is well illustrated by the manner in 
which the persistent social and intellectual struggles over the space of habitation in Beirut 
take religious and sectarian character. 
Throughout history, the coastal cities of Lebanon shaped their populations. Being, 
essentially, merchant cities, they function as places where, in spite of the country's artificial 
and imposed borders, people have a chance to create and share a culture. By culture I mean 
a plural "system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and 
communicating" where the individuals are challenged to recognize each other as belonging 
to the same nation.4 The word "nation" is used here with strong reserve since Lebanon as a 
nation is still under construction. I consider "nation" as a cultural concept that has already 
been launched in Lebanon. Naturally, there are different interpretations of the meaning of 
nationhood in Lebanon, but a shared sense of belonging to a specific territory that has its 
clear political identity is common between many communities in Lebanon. I argue that the 
nineteenth-century Beirut was a microcosm where such Gellnerian "convictions and 
loyalties and solidarities" were born that invested the Beiruti intelligentsia with the 
potential to create a very different Middle East of what exists today. It provided fertile 
ground for the evolvement of Ottomanism, Muslim Reformism, Syrianism and Arabism, 
and later, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Lebanism. However, even if these 
currents shared various degrees of inclusiveness and supra-denominational openness, due to 
the special historical and geo-political background of the creation of "Greater Lebanon", 
after World War I the place of intercommunal cooperation so characteristic of the end of 
the nineteenth century, was gradually taken over by collision and open conflict. 
The most creative phase of the unique Beiruti intellectual endeavour started in 1863, 
only three years after the massacre of Christians in Mount Lebanon, when Boutros al-
Boustani's National School opened its gates to pupils of all sects and beliefs to study under 
the guidance of the most eminent Muslim and Christian educators and scholars of the time. 
Boustani's initiative meant the triumph of loyalty to the land, Mount Lebanon and Beirut in 
particular, and to its Arabic heritage in general, and a firm belief in a promising common 
future for all its inhabitants. 
It must be noted, that the duality and balance of European and Ottoman influence 
ensured the stability that made possible the realization of such initiatives. The struggle for 
influence between the Ottomans, the British, and the French over cultural and economic 
control helped to create a long lasting liberal environment in which schools, newspapers 
2 Salibi, Kamal: A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. I.B. Tauris & Co 
Ltd, 1993. 1. 
3 Khalaf, Samir - Kongstad, Per: Hamra of Beirut: a case of rapid urbanization. Brill, Leiden, 1973. 
2-3. 
4 Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. 7. 
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and societies proliferated.5 As Leila Fawaz has shown, at mid-century, this city was a place 
where foreigners dominated the economic and political sphere. However, the civil war of 
1860 also generated a deep crisis for the imperial government in Istanbul and urged it to 
accelerate provincial and municipal reforms.6 Thus, the nineteenth-century Beirut was at 
once the product, the object, and the project of overlapping European, Ottoman, and 
municipal civilising missions competed in the fields of administration, infrastructure, urban 
planning, public health, education, customs, journalism, and architecture. 
With the direct control of France after 1921, and its determination to guarantee the 
political dominance of its Christian allies, the atmosphere changed, and the imposed 
westernization together with the Maronite supremacy gave way to upheavals and unrest 
thus making the newborn state more and more vulnerable to the enforcement of foreign 
interests in the decades that followed. 
The aim of this essay is to give a broad outline of Beirut's transformations in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, with special attention to one of its quarters called Zuqaq 
el-Blat (Zuqãq al-Balãt), the birthplace of those intellectual efforts that could at the same 
time absorb and preserve confessional identities and amalgamate them into an exemplary 
and specific universe, capable of providing forum for dialogue and mutual efforts for self-
definition. 
The first part of this study is dedicated to a general historical background of the 
nineteenth-century Beirut, which is followed by the description of the cultural ambience in 
its most famous and important 'intellectual workshop', Zuqaq el-Blat. The third part of the 
essay provides an outlook to the city's later history and the impact of the imposed 
Confessionalist structure with hints to the symbolic degradation of its cultural heritage and 
its conscious abandonment by the potent actors of the contemporary political life. This 
paper is aimed to challenge the repeatedly reinforced notion of Lebanon as a place - with 
Jens Hanssen words - "where things copied from the west are considered material proof of 
progress and a conscious stepping-out of centuries of improductive identity accumulation".7 
I. Beirut in the 19th Century 
1. Historical background 
The two main religious groups of Mount Lebanon, the Christian Maronite and the 
Muslim Druze communities developed peaceful relations with each other. The balance 
power was shaken when in 1788 the Maronite Bashir Shihab II (1767-1850) was elected 
emir and appointed wali of Mount Lebanon, and the Druze leaders were extruded from 
political power. The first bigger clashes between the two communities that contained 
5 Fawaz, Leila: "Foreign Presence and Perception of Ottoman Rule in Beirut." In: Jens Hanssen -
Thomas Philip - Stefan Weber (ed.): The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capital's in the Late 
Ottoman Empire. Orient-Institut, Beirut, 2002. 93-104. 
6 Review by Jens Hanssen of Samir Kassir's Histoire de Beyrouth available: 
http://www.atrissi.com/kassir/books2.html 
7 Ibid. 
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sectarian character as well, took place in the 1820s. Bashir II supported Muhammad 'Ali 
(1769-1849), the pasha of Egypt who took Acre from the Ottomans in 1822, consequently 
the Druze forces were aligned with the Ottoman wali of Damascus. Bashir II disarmed the 
Druze and allied with France, governing in the name of Muhammad 'Ali, who entered 
Lebanon and formally took power in 1832. In the following years the conflict was deepened 
by the increasing economic isolation of the Druze, and the growing wealth of the 
Maronites. 
Shortly after Bashir II had been forced to leave and the Ottoman Empire reasserted 
control, in 1841 clashes broke out between the Druze and the Maronites and for twenty 
years unrest and tension prevailed in the mountains. In 1842 the French, British, Russian, 
Austrian, and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul met with the Ottoman foreign minister, but 
agreed only on the irreconcilability of the Druze and Maronite positions. Consequently, 
they decided to divide the Mountain into two qa 'im-maqamiyyas (governorates), one in the 
north under a Maronite governor and the other in the south under a Druze district governor. 
Therefore, as Ussama Makdisi commented, in 1842 Europeans together with the Ottomans 
reinvented Mount Lebanon in sectarian terms, dividing it administratively along religious 
lines.8 
In the south, however, placed under a Druze administrator lived a large number of 
Maronites, whose lord-peasant relationship gradually broke down and was replaced by a 
more egalitarian structure. This led to tensions among the Maronites still living in the north, 
and the peasants began to express their resentment toward the "feudal" privileges of their 
notables. The rebellions started in 1858 in the north encouraged the Druze to regain then-
lost supremacy over the whole territory. Their military offensive in April 1860 turned into a 
general massacre of Christians in Mount Lebanon that spread into Damascus.9 After such 
antecedents the civil war of 1860 can be seen as partly an outcome of the administrative 
redefinition of communal and social boundaries and a response to the declining feudal 
system.10 After 1860-61 a special administrative regime, the mutasarrifìyya, was 
established, giving the Mountain more autonomy from rest of the Ottoman Empire. 
2. Beirut the Imperial City 
Until the 1830s, Beirut had only been a harbour city of secondary importance behind 
Tripoli, Sidon, and Acre. It was a small medieval town with six gates, souqs, khans, narrow 
streets, hammams, churches, mosques and a population from various origins and of 
different confessions. In opposition to Jerusalem, Istanbul or Damascus, Beirut did not have 
distinct confessional quarters and "there was no professional segregation between 
confessions, nor was there any opposition between the districts and production activities, 
and the white izar covered all women, Christian and Muslim alike".11 
8 Makdisi, Ussama: The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000. 84-86. 
9 Weiss-Green: A Survey of Arab History. American University of Cairo, 1995. 249-50. 
10 Makdisi, 133-136. 
11 Barakat, Liliane Buccianti: "Beirut - A City With So Many Faces." In: Dela 21. 2004. 485-493., 
available: http://www.ff.uni-lj.si/oddelki/geo/Publikacije/Dela/files/Dela_21/043a%20baracat.pdf 
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As Samir Khalaf pointed out, the most definitive symptoms of urbanisation - rural 
exodus and the spill of the population beyond its medieval walls - did not really appear in 
any substantial form until the 1860s.12 The decisive moment in the history of the city was 
when Ibrahim Pasha made it an administrative centre during the Egyptian occupation 
(1832-1841). The growing political importance led to the development of the harbour into 
the major import-export trading centre for Mount Lebanon and the Syrian hinterland and to 
the rise of a new urban commercial bourgeoisie.13 When the Ottomans regained control, 
Beirut was made the capital first of the wilayet of Sidon in 1842, later that of the wilayet of 
Beirut from 1883. Thus, urbanization in Beirut was more a precedent or antecedent to 
economic development than its result.14 
It is true that after the war in 1860 refugees from Damascus and Mount Lebanon have 
created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion in Beirut, still, the city was not profoundly 
affected by the socio-political tensions between 1840 and 1860. According to Leila Fawaz 
as compared to the clashes in Mount Lebanon, Beirut enjoyed a certain degree of stability 
during the nineteenth century despite the vast influx of refugees. When sectarian tensions 
broke out in the capital from time to time, mostly due to the forced westernisation and 
Christian economical dominance, the urban notables of different confessions made joint 
efforts for a quick settlement.15 
Beirut grossly benefitted from the Ottoman urban reforms carried out in response to the 
strengthening western influence in the region. Construction of infrastructures and 
communication took place: the harbour was widened, a road and then a railroad joined 
Beirut to Damascus; telegraph and gas lighting were installed, electric tramway was 
inaugurated, and streets were paved. The Ottoman government expanded the city beyond its 
walls and a new centre of business and transportation activity emerged on the eastern side 
extra muros, in the area where trade caravans gathered and organized before entering the 
city. The place later was named as Martyrs' Square in memory of those six Lebanese 
patriots who rose against the Ottoman rule.16 This area further developed when the 
Ottomans transformed a part of it into a public garden on the northern side of which the 
Petit Sérail (the Small Government Palace) was built in 1884.17 Edifices such as the 
Beirut's City Hall, Train Station, the Grand Sérail, and the Ottoman Bank were constructed 
in this period. The last Ottoman wall was demolished in 1915. 
As Ralph Bodenstein writes "the intensified trade and the increasing political presence 
of European powers - particularly in the wake of the 1860s civil clashes in Mount Lebanon 
and Damascus - made Beirut an interface between the European countries and the United 
12 Khalaf, Samir: The Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj. Saqi, London, 2006. 21. 
13 Bodenstein, Ralph: "Housing the Foreign." In: Jens Hanssen - Thomas Philip - Stefan Weber (ed.): 
The Empire in the City... 105-127. 
14 Khalaf, Samir - Kongstad, Per: Hamra of Beirut... 3. 
15 The most serious of such clashes were the great riots of September 1903 between Greek Orthodox 
and Sunni groups. Fawaz, Leila: Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA and London, 1983. 
16 Sarkis, Hashim: "A Vital Void Reconstructions of Downtown Beirut." In: Vale, Lawrence J. -
Campanella, Thomas J. (ed.): The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster. OUP, 
Oxford, 2005. 281-298. 
17 Khalaf, 63. 
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States on the one hand and the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire on the other 
hand."18 Foreign consulates, missionary and educational institutions were established; next 
to the numerous primary and secondary schools, American Protestant missionaries built the 
first university in Beirut in 1866 followed by St. Joseph University, established by the 
Jesuits mission in 1875. Between 1860 and 1880, Europeans invested massively into silk 
economy, more than 200 mechanical spinning mills were set up in the mountains. Some, 
mostly Christian traders, became European trade agents and grossly benefited from the 
concentration of western interests. The new local bourgeoisie identified more and more 
with western cultural values and took charge most of the innovations indispensable to the 
modernization of a city such as transport, lighting, food and public health.19 In the 
framework of the Tanzimat (Ottoman reforms initiated in 1839), new administrative 
divisions were introduced to reassert their more or less direct rule over Lebanon, causing a 
growing opposition between the Turkish power and the emerging local bourgeoisie.20 From 
about 10.000 inhabitants in 1840 the population rose to around 120.000 in 1900 
accompanied by the mushrooming development of new residential quarters extra muros?1 
It is also necessary to acknowledge that unlike the mutasarrifiyya of Mt. Lebanon, 
Beirut's main institution of government, the municipal council, was not institutionalized 
into confessional quotas (what is referred to in Lebanon as the s itt a sitta mukarrar logic) 
until the French Mandate period. A chart of the composition of first one hundred popularly 
elected municipal councillors between 1868 and 1908 demonstrates how widely the 
religious affiliations of its twelve members oscillated. Unlike in Istanbul and Alexandria, 
after 1877 foreigners were barred from municipal elections in Beirut. According to Hanssen 
the municipal council defended the interests of the city against European capitalism and 
colonialism, and against the Ottoman imperial government.22 He argues that the Ottoman 
government's decision to listen to the calls for the creation of a new province around Beirut 
and grant it provincial capital status in 1888 paved the way for fondamental urban and 
regional reconfigurations long before colonial policies during the French Mandate period. 
This new Ottoman province came to constitute the territorial embodiment of regional self-
determination for Arab nationalists in Beirut until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
after World War I. 
Π. Zuqaq al-Blat 
1. Setting 
Zuqãq al-Balãt, which means "cobbled lane" in Arabic is the name of a Beirut 
neighbourhood whose main street, named after Amin Beyhum, was the first paved road 
outside the old town, built in the framework of the infrastructure works during Egyptian 
18 Bodenstein, 106. 
19 Barakat, 487. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Bodenstein, 106. 
22 Review by Jens Hanssen... 
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rule (1831-1840). The quarter stretches between the Grand Sérail in the north and the 
Greek Catholic Patriarchate in the south. It is one of the extra muros areas of Beirut that 
developed from middle of the nineteenth century as a residential quarter for the Beiruti 
bourgeoisie who left their old houses intra muros and built villa residences in the orchards 
and gardens on the hills overlooking the old town and the sea.23 
Zuqaq el-Blat occupies a unique position within Beirut's urban fabric and it can be 
considered as a microcosm of the history of modern Beirut. It was one of the city's first 
sites of urban expansion before 1840; during the Civil War (1975-1990) parts of the district 
were on the Green Line (demarcation zone) between Christian East and Muslim West-
Beirut. After the war rebuilding affected only the northern parts because of its proximity to 
the downtown commercial centre but completely neglected the south-eastern region, a fact 
that well exemplifies the anomalies of Lebanon's post-war reconstruction both in its social 
and political aspects. 
The introduction of an outstanding interdisciplinary study History, Space and Social 
Conflict in Beirut refers to the Lebanese writer and biographer Paul Suwayd, stating that 
three distinct cultural centres existed in mid-nineteenth century Beirut, the oldest of which 
was Zuqaq el-Blat "where from the 1840s to the 1880s, the Boustanis and Yazijis taught, 
wrote and published an enormous range of Arabic literature and appealed to their 
compatriots to embrace social and confessional harmony".24 It was here that the Yazijis 
developed Modern Standard Arabic, taught and wrote about Ottoman, Arab and Syrian 
patriotism. Boutrus and Salim al-Boustani considered the centrality of their country in the 
global economy as well as the geographical division of labour between Bab Beirut and Batn 
Syria in the 1880s. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani and Khalil Sarkis, the publishers of the two 
main newspapers, Thamarat al-Funun and Lis an al-Hal were residents of this district.25 
In the past, Zuqaq el-Blat was a place for wealth and luxury. From a mainly agri- and 
horticultural area outside the city walls in the 1820s it turned to become first a garden 
suburb with growing educational institutions in its golden age, and later, in the second half 
of the twentieth century to a densely populated pericentral city quarter.26 A comparison of 
the maps of the 1840s with the 1876 Löytved map shows that the urbanisation of Zuqaq el-
Blat advanced vigorously from the middle of the nineteenth century.27 The Ottoman 
infantry barracks (later, in 1920 turned into the "Grand Sérail"), a military hospital (erected 
in the 1860s and turned into the Palais de Justice in 1920), the residence of the mutasarrifs, 
consulates, and the establishment of schools ensured the high status of the quarter and made 
it attractive for foreigners as well. Ottomans and Europeans rented lodgings from local 
owners, shared their houses and socialised with them,28 so even if the number of foreigners 
23 Bodenstein, 105-106. 
24 Gebhardt, Hans (ed.): History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut. The Quarter of Zokak el-Blat. 
Beiruter Texte und Studien 97. Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut, 2005. 2. 
25 Review by Jens Hanssen... 
26 Bodenstein, Ralph: "The Making and Remaking of Zokak el-Blat." In: History, Space and Social 
Conflict in Beirut, 36-107. 
27 Ibid. 63. 
28 Özveren, Yaçar Eyüp: The Making and Unmaking of an Ottoman Port-City: Nineteenth Century 
Beirut, Its Hinterland, and the World-Economy. Ph.D. diss., State University of New York, 
Binghamton, 1990. 151. Quoted by Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 65. 
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in the city was not more than 1-3 per cent of the population until the French Mandate 
Period,29 together with the local upper- and middle class they created 'foreign-native 
continuum' that was characteristic of the late nineteenth-century Beirut.30 
To mention only a few significant religious institutions of this quarter: the Armenian 
Prelacy of Lebanon was also seated here in 1920 with its centre the St. Nichan Armenian 
Orthodox Church built later, in 1938, just south of the Sérail. At the centre of the quarter 
stands a Sunni mosque dating from the mid nineteenth century, now dominated by the 
sunni-sufi group al-Ahbash.31 At the northern border of Zuqaq el-Blat, below the hilltop 
Grand Sérail building stands Beirut's only Synagogue, Maghen Abraham. The surrounding 
area, known as Wadi Abou Jamil, was historically the Jewish neighbourhood of Beirut. The 
Selim Tarrab Talmudic School building was demolished sometime after 2006.32 
In Zuqaq el-Blat the socio-economic status of the neighbour was always more important 
than his religious affiliation. Until the mid twentieth century, residences were inhabited by 
better off people from different confessions such as later, in the years of degradation, slums 
are housing the poor of different ethnic and religious background (Kurds, Palestinians, 
Shiites, Sunnis). According to the family names of the population of Zuqaq el-Blat was 
mixed, mostly Sunnis lived together with Christians of all denominations, and their 
mansions were surrounded by the modest houses of their clients. As a late resident, Lamis 
Mukhayesh recalls her memories from the 1950s: "On religious holidays, we all celebrated 
together. In Rue Mar Elias, where Christians and Muslims used to live, they decorated for 
Christmas as well as for Ramadan."33 The large residences of mercantile families were the 
first in the quarter, but later became surrounded by lower and middle class homes, forming 
a heterogeneous settlement pattern common in the Middle East.34 
Despite the many political and consequently social and architectural changes, the 
quarter did not cease to be a cultural centre till the outbreak of the war. A good example for 
this fact is the mansion of Maud Farjallah that gave place to Beirut's longest-lived weekly 
salon where politicians, foreign diplomats and intellectuals met between World War I and 
1963. The Pios Building was another famous place where in the 1950s and 1960s 
intellectuals, painters, and journalists gathered regularly.35 In his book Al-Hawajis al-
Aqalliyya (Minority Anxieties), the Lebanese author Ramez Khalil Sarkis, bom in the 
quarter in 1921, describes Zuqaq el-Blat as a model cosmopolitan space. According to him, 
die district was inhabited by middle class "spiritual families" - using Michel Chiha's term: 
al-'ã'ilãt al-ruhiyya - who created an atmosphere of mutual respect and support that 
represented "the essence and phenomenon of Beirut in particular and Lebanon in general 
and intuitively held the firm belief in their humble popular wisdom that if only we 
29 Fawaz, Leila: Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut. Cambridge (Mass.), 1983. 52. 
30 Özveren, The Making and Unmaking... Quoted by Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 65. 
31 "Walking Through Zokak el-Blat." In: History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 23-33. 
32 http://members.virtualtourist.com/rn/acl lc/lb809c/4/?o=l&i=3 
33 Stolleis, Friederike: "The Inhabitants of Zokak el-Blat." In: History, Space and Social Conflict in 
Beirut... 175-211. 
34 Ibid. 178. 
35 History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 30. 
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[Lebanese] lived together and understood each other we'd be safe and well."36 The social 
and cultural bonds of Maronites, Sunnis, Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and 
Protestants - that Sarkis calls al-rãbifa al-busßniyya - were further strengthened by 
"brotherhood of milk" (ukhüwat al-halîb), a good example of which is the "milk bond" that 
connected the Sunni Yamouts to the Sarkis family. Khalil Sarkis brings examples how 
these ties created solidarity even in the years of the war.37 
2. Golden Age 
Zuqaq el-Blat played a prominent role in the Arab cultural renewal which took place in 
different places in the Arab World. One major figure in this renewal, especially in 
education and Arabic language modernization, is Boutros al-Boustani who founded the 
National School in 1863.38 Due to the journalistic and educational efforts, it became a place 
where leading Syro-Lebanese, Arab-Ottoman and Egyptian intellectuals met since the 
second half of the nineteenth century. These thinkers played a decisive role in the 
development of the most important trends of modern Arab political thought - Ottomanism, 
Arabism, Syrianism and Muslim Reformism. Although Lebanism as a national ideology 
emerged only during and immediately after World War I, its most influential promoter, 
Michel Chiha (1891-1954) was also rooted in Zuqaq el-Blat's intellectual circles. It was 
also this quarter where the serialised Arabic novel and the newspaper commentary took 
their first forms as articulators of political expression.39 
The relative stability in Beirut and Mount Lebanon after 1860, under the Ottoman rule, 
encouraged the scholarly renaissance that took place in this diverse, dynamic, late-Ottoman 
bourgeois district.40 Residents of Zuqaq el-Blat were among others Boutros al-Boustani 
(1818-1883), Khalil Sarkis (1842-1915), Abd el-Qader Qabbani (1837-1935), Hussein 
Beyhum (1833-1881), Ahmad Abbas al-Azhari (1852-1929).41 By the turn of the century, 
these intellectuals, journalists, teachers, national politicians, and municipal councillors had 
already formed flourishing interconfessional networks "of neighbours who visited each 
other, participated in the same regular saloons and were employed in the same institutions. 
(...) They wrote school books, edited newspapers and left behind foundational texts of 
modern political thought and social reform that continued to inspire scholars of the Middle 
East into the age of decolonisation, nationalism and beyond."42 
The ideas of the intellectual elite connected to Arabic Revival (al-nahda al- 'arabiyya) 
were spread in the numerous primary and secondary schools of the quarter by novel 
teaching methods that combined Arab tradition with the most important principles and 
36 Al-Hawâjis al-Aqalliyya: Min Zuqâq al Blat ila Kensington. Beirut, 1993. 25-26. Quoted in 
History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 3-4. 
37 Sarkis, 10-12. In: History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 4. 
38 Yazbaq, Ibrahim Yusuf: Al-Awraq al-Lubnaniyya. Vol. 1, Beirut, 1955. 118. Quoted in History, 
Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 6. 
39 Hanssen, Jens: "The Birth of an Education Quarter." In: History, Space and Social Conflict in 
Beirut... 143-174. 
40 Ibid. 144. 
41 Ibid. 165-174. 
42 Ibid. 144-145. 
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practices of the European enlightenment. Consequently, "the guarantors of the remarkably 
stable hegemony of Beirut's late Ottoman bourgeois public sphere were secondary school 
students who - as audience and later as articulators - came of age between the 1860s and 
1880s."43 According to Jens Hanssen "the literary networks, newspaper journalists, schools 
and teachers generated a communication- and information-based public sphere which 
mediated between Beirut's population, the Ottoman state and foreign missionaries. Almost 
2500 pupils studied in these institutions the most important of which were Boutros al-
Boustani's National School (al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya) inaugurated in 1866, one of the 
three imperial lyceums, the Madrasa Sultaniyya, opened in 1883, the Ottoman College 
('Uthmaniyya) founded in 1895 by Ahmad 'Abbas al-Azhari, and the Greek Catholic 
Patriarchal School (Patrarkiyya), four of the most prestigious secondary schools in Bilad 
al-Sham. The School of Arts and Crafts (Sanayeh) an industrial education complex 
concentrating on teaching practical skills for underprivileged children was opened in 1907, 
and the Rushdiyya was opened in 1910, called (from rushd, adolescence), an advanced 
primary school brought into existence by the Ottoman Public School Law of 1869 and 
instituted thereafter throughout the empire."44 
For almost 150 years a cross-confessional upper and middle-class population formed the 
intellectual life of Zuqaq al-Blat among whom Christians were a relative minority, still their 
role proved to be formative owing to such unique and outstanding figures as Boutros 
Boustani. In his National School pupils and teachers of all sects and beliefs were 
guaranteed freedom to carry out their respective religious practices. Proselytizing was 
strictly prohibited, and educators shared their knowledge and collaborated in service of the 
future generations. A contemporary American missionary drew attention to the remarkable 
fact that "in little over three years after the dreadful scenes of massacres and blood[shed] in 
1860, there should be gathered in Beirut a school of 115 boarders composed of almost all 
various sects in the land and that children of Moslem sheikhs and papal priests, and Druze 
okkals should study side by side."45 To teach Islamic religion and philosophy, the protestant 
Boutros al-Bustani invited the prominent scholar, Ahmad 'Abbas, a graduate from al-Azhar 
University in Cairo. The students came from Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Istanbul and 
Greece, and among the locals we find persons like Ibrahim Bey al-Aswad, 'Abd al-Qadir 
Dana, 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani who by the turn of the century became the leading 
intellectuals and municipal councillors in Beirut.46 
As early as in 1867 the teachers of the National School founded the interconfessional 
Syrian Scientific Society {al-J am 'iyya al- 'ilmiyya al-Sûriyya) "for the spread of knowledge, 
science and arts".47 In 1875 Shaykh Youssef Assir (1815-1889), the teacher of Arabic 
grammar in Boustani's school founded the Society of Arts {Jam 'iyyat al-funüri), which put 
more emphasis on applied arts and practical skills than on foreign languages and liberal 
arts. The society launched a bi-weekly newspaper Thamarât al-Funün and its Muslim 
43 Ibid.l 48. 
44 Ibid. 147. 
45 American Board of Commissioners, Foreign Missions, 16.8.1., Syrian Mission vol. 5, Annual 
Report of the Beirut Station for 1863. Quoted in History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 32. 
46 Hanssen, Jens: "The Birth of an Education Quarter." In: History, Space and Social Conflict in 
Beirut... 152. 
47 Ibid. 153-4. 
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activists formed the Maqassed- Islamic Benevolent Society - in 1878 "to promote modern 
state education, uphold Islamic morality and embrace the principles of the Ottoman Public 
Education Law of 1869". Its founder 'Abd al-Qadir Qabbani aimed to follow the Jewish 
and Christian curricula as examples and launched two schools for Muslim girls as well.48 
The Muslim schools of Zuqaq el-Blat pursued the liberal arts tradition, their aim was to 
produce educated workforce for the institutions of modern society.49 The deans of the 
Ottoman College were prominent journalists, such as Ahmad Tabbara, the owner of the 
Beiruti newspaper al-Ittihad al- 'Uthmani, and 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi, the owner of al-
Mufid, and leading politicians of the Beirut Reform Movement during the Young Turk 
Period (1889-1908). Among the teachers we find two influential female figures as well, 
such as 'Afifa and Zahida Shihab.50 
After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 many refugees arrived to Beirut, among 
them the leading Egyptian reformist Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), who was 
enthusiastically accepted by the Zuqaq el-Blat intellectuals. 'Abduh spread the ideas of 
reform in Lebanon and gained many disciples, both Christians and Muslims through 
writings as well teaching Islamic theology in the high school al-Madrasa al-Sultaniyya.51 
Between 1827 and 1871 the Protestant missionary work centred around Zuqaq el-Blat, 
and their schools had a formative influence on the intellectual life of the quarter. The 
Mission House was set up in 1832 followed by the first printing press in the Middle East in 
1853. The library of the Mission - where Eli Smith began to translate the Bible into Arabic 
- housed valuable Arabic manuscripts and liturgical literature.52 With the leadership of 
Boutros al-Boustani, local members of the Protestant Congregation founded the Native 
Syrian Church in 1848. The most important missionary institution the Syrian Protestant 
College (later the American University of Beirut), was opened in 1866, and in 1870 moved 
to away to the more exclusive Ras Beirut.53 One of the quarter's earliest school complexes 
was established in 1860 by the British Syrian Missions and later became the Lebanese 
Evangelical School. 
As Jens Hanssen stresses, in the second half of the 19th century, "Zuqaq el Blat became 
the meeting place of leading members of both strands of the Arabic revival - the Christian 
secularists of Beirut and Alexandria and the Islamic reform movement of Damascus and 
Cairo".54 Hanssen also mentions an assumption according to which some Zuqaq el-Blat 
intellectuals formed the secret society called Union of the Three Faiths with the aim to 
"unite the Islamic, Christian and Jewish faiths and to co-operate in relieving the East of the 
pressure exerted by the West".55 
48 Ibid. 154-5. 
49 Ibid. 157. 
50 Ibid. 161. 
51 Ibid. 157-8. 
52 Ibid. 149-150. 
53 Ibid. 150. 
54 Ibid. 158. 
55 Amin, Osman: Muhammad Abduh (1944), translated from Arabic by Charles Wendel. Washington, 
1953. 7. Quoted by Hanssen, Jens: "The Birth of an Education Quarter." In: History, Space and 
Social Conflict in Beirut... 158. 
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On the basis of Hanssen's study a high degree of interconnectedness, moreover 
intimacy can be supposed between Muslim and Christian scholar circles. The intellectual 
atmosphere of Zuqaq el-Blat provided not only an open space to negotiate common ground 
between Christian and Muslim visions of Lebanon but also set a promising path for 
Lebanon's political culture. 
Ш. Stages of Decline 
1. French Mandate 
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the World War I, the French gained 
control over Syria. The five provinces that make up present-day Lebanon were soon 
separated from the rest of Syria pleading that its Christian population needed protection. 
Besides Beirut and Mount Lebanon, "Greater Lebanon" included the coastline (Sahil), the 
Beqaa Valley and Anti-Lebanon as well, thus including significant number of Druze, 
Shiites and Sunnis into the would be state. Consequently, Lebanese Christians, of which the 
Maronites were the largest subgrouping, now constituted barely more than 50 per cent of 
the population, while the number of Sunnis multiplied eightfold, and the Shiites fourfold. 
Thus the quota system that was accepted on the basis of the national census of 1932, and 
made Maronites the official majority assuring them political dominance as opposed to the 
numerical majority of the Shiite community, generated mistrust and ignited alienation.56 
The Maronites had indicated precisely what they wanted, mobilized into politics earlier 
than the Muslims and had - with the help of the French - dominated the political and the 
economic system. A western oriented business class pulled in foreign capital, but the 
institutional, politico-sectarian structure created gross social inequalities and disparity in 
economic development between Beirut and the rest of the country. Greater Beirut and the 
mountainous areas in south and north of the city were like a prosperous mini state while the 
Akkair region in the north, Jabal al-'Amil in the south and Beqaa Valley in the east, 
populated by mostly Sunni and Shiite Muslims, were zones of economic stagnation.57 
Under the French Mandate, serious efforts were initiated to prepare master plans by the 
architect and planner Michel Ecochard (1905-1985) for Beirut. Functionalism and 
rationalism set such an urban zoning in which the segregation of functions became the key 
56 The census of 1932 concluded that there was a demographical 5:6 proportion between Muslims and 
Christians of the population. Under French pressure the presidency went to a Christian, the premier to 
a Sunni and speakership to Shiite. On the basis of the 1932 census, parliament seats were divided 
according to a six-to-five Christian/Muslim ratio. The constitution gave the president veto power over 
any legislation approved by parliament, virtually ensuring that the 6:5 ratio would not be revised in 
the event that the population distribution changed. See: Sarkis, 51. 
57 Nicolaysen, Leif G. N.: Consociationalism and Segmented Cleavages'. The Case of Lebanon. 
Master thesis in Political Science, STV 3902, Department of Political Science Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Troms0, May 2008. 26. 
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concept.58 In order to eradicate the old urban order major constructions such as the National 
Museum of Beirut, the Parliament, the Frenchmen avenue - a replica of the Englishmen 
Promenade in Nice were carried out starting in 1924. During the 1930s, the old Arab core 
disappeared to be replaced by a modern French style centralization set around the 
Parliament: Place de l'Étoile (the Star Square), with large orthogonal arteries named after 
French heroes. Military cemeteries appeared, signboards were written in French, khans 
were transformed into theatres and cinemas. The Lebanese traditional house increased in 
height thanks to new building techniques and the ochre colour became dominant in the 
city.59 The confessional minorities (Christian, Jewish, a small Sunnite elite as well as the 
Armenian refugees) beneficiating from the support of the mandatory country adopted 
European customs in every field of life. 
However, the new middle class' residential areas were sited in locations far from the 
elites, so it was the beginning of social exclusion in the city. In the new suburbs where 
social and economic discomfort prevailed, youth movements, charities and sports clubs 
sprang up. In order to gain political support they put themselves under the protection of 
sectarian based parties; and later, during the unrest in 1958 and in the civil war, constituted 
manpower for the militias.60 
Confessionalism gradually drove the non-Christian communities to seek a similar type 
of mobilization, beginning in the 1940s as an effort to balance the growth of Christian 
influence. As a result, this mode of modernization forced the process of urbanization to be 
framed by a confessional form. Therefore, instead of assuming a class-based and nationally 
inclusive character, urban transformation was shaped by group solidarity. Privileged 
confessional groups concentrated themselves in the urban centres, whereas disadvantaged 
communities ended up in the suburbs and peripheries. Within this context, urbanization in 
Lebanon has been a process of displacing people from a familiar rural setting but at the 
same timed it has forced the urban social actors to resurrect their primordial allegiances, 
such as familism, regionalism and sectarianism, in order to tackle the hardships of urban 
life providing members of a given group with all sorts of welfare, health and education 
services.61 As Samir Khalaf pointed out, "urbanization in Beirut as a physical and 
ecological phenomena has not been accompanied by an equal degree of urbanism as a way 
of life".62 
* 
During the Mandate period, Zuqaq el-Blat remained an important locus of power, 
housing institutions of colonial administration, such as the seat of the French High 
58 Ghorayeb, M.: "The work and influence of Michel Ecochard in Lebanon." In: Rowe, P. - Sarkis, H. 
(eds.): Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. Prestel-
Verlag, 1998. 106-121. 
59 Barakat, 488. 
60 Soliman, 23. 
61 Salamey, Imad - Tabar, Paul: "Consociational Democracy and Urban Sustainability: Transforming 
the Confessional Divides in Beirut." In: Ethnopolitics, Vol. 7, Nos. 2-3, June-September 2008. 239-
263. 
62 Khalaf- Kongstad: Hamra... 3. 
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Commissioner (accommodated in the Grand Sérail), the Law Courts, and the French 
Admiralty.63 However, while before the introduction of the confessional system enlightened 
ideas and intellectual ties proved to be stronger than kinship, in the coming decades 
estrangement and distancing took over.64 
From the 1920s the concentration of economical activities and job opportunities (mostly 
on the construction sites) in centre Beirut generated Shiite, Kurd, and Armenian settlement 
in Zuqaq el-Blat because of its proximity to the city centre. Shiites arrived from the 
annexed Jabal 'Amil and the Beqaa valley, while Armenians and Kurds were refugees from 
neighbouring countries. The migration caused a significant population growth in the quarter 
between 1921 and 1931 from 6200 to 8200 inhabitants. Consequently, between 1920 and 
1945, the number of buildings increased by about 30 per cent.65 Nevertheless, the 
settlement of poorer migrants made some upper and middle-class families leave Zuqaq el-
Blat. 
2. Beirut, "Open City" 
The laissez-faire politics of presidents Béchara el-Khoury (1943-1952) and Camille 
Chamoun (1952-1958) created economic prosperity for Beirut. The Banking Secrecy 
(1956) transformed the capital into a "safe for fuel income". Lebanon reached the peak of 
its economic success in the mid-1960's, but the stability and prosperity was paralyzed by 
the collapse of Intra Bank, the country's most important financial institution, in 1966. 
Between the 1940s and 1960s the Lebanese government shaped the face of the growing 
metropolis from the plans of foreign experts like Écochard, Egli and Doxiadis, by building 
bypass roads north of downtown.66 
Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s the rapid urbanization in metropolitan 
Beirut, or "Greater Beirut", coincided with dramatic demographic expansion. In 1960 
Greater Beirut's population stood at 450,000 residents, but the number had increased 
threefold by 1975 to 1,250,ООО.67 This rapid expansion of the city population initially 
favoured the growth of middle-class and secular neighbourhoods where city and market 
growth weakened confessional demarcations.68 However, as opposed to the capital, rural 
areas remained underdeveloped, thus social inequality and tensions were constantly on the 
rise in spite of the reform politics of the Shihab era (1958-1964). The consequent massive 
rural migration presented a major challenge to both the traditional sectarian and secular 
urban areas and catalyzed a rising contention over the sectarian distribution of urban space 
and state resources. According to the analysis of I. Salamey and P. Tabar this led to 
outbursts of violent sectarian conflicts for the past 50 years that "have often undermined the 
many 'consociational' aspects of the urban communities".69 
63 Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 67. 
64 History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 5. 
65 Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 69. 
66 Sarkis, 290. 
67 Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 242. 
68 Ibid. 247. 
69 Ibid. 242. 
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The centre belonged to the confessionally mixed high and middle-class bourgeoisie. 
West of downtown, an area called Ras Beirut "was an important hub for literary and 
publishing activities that made Beirut centre of Arabic-language free press. Finally, the 
concentration of students, writers, journalists, academics, and radicals in Ras Beirut meant 
that the area enjoyed an atmosphere of social permissiveness".70 Arab tourists and 
businessmen from the Gulf States came in great number to Beirut which, for them, 
represented Switzerland (Banking Secrecy), Monaco (Casino) and Paris for its shops and 
leisure activities. A second down-town, Hamra street was established with offices, hotels, 
cinemas, merchant galleries making out of this avenue the Middle-East Champs-Elysées. 
On the eve of the war, and in order to satisfy the needs of a totally addicted consumers' 
society, a third urban pole construction was about to start in Sodeco street in Ashrafiyeh. 
Real-estate investments multiplied and the number of new suburbs increased. The capital 
was named the Greater Beirut with more than one million inhabitants annexing the narrow 
coastal plain as well.71 
Since the end of World War II, Beirut witnessed a heavy population shift due to 
sociopolitical and economic crises. The inflow of capital and investments attracted not only 
the rural population of the interior but also refugees. In the villages recently attached to the 
capital second generation rural migrants lived, essentially wage-earners, officers and 
craftsmen. Between this intensifying ring and what could be considered as the middle-
suburb of Beirut, articulated the "Misery belt" constituted of the Palestinian camps and the 
spontaneous districts of mostly Shiites migrants fleeing from the Israeli retaliations in the 
South.72 Consequently, cells of poverty took roots in unhealthy zones such as Karm el-
Zeitoun and Hayy al-Syrian. The informal, illegal suburbs started to mushroom as "the 
people's spontaneous and creative response to the state's incapacity to satisfy the basic 
needs of the impoverished masses".73 Urban informality thus often managed through illegal 
attempts of the low and middle strata of the society to restore their "space" or "order" to the 
urban landscape.74 As Barakat claims "their inhabitants were 'the left out' population, 
forgotten by the posterity and growth enjoyed by the 'first category citizens'. This situation 
provoked resentment and allowed the militias to recruit among the frustrated youngsters, 
offering them an ideology based on fighting for their rights and taking their revenge".5 The 
French planners did not touch the informal areas surrounding the city of Beirut for religious 
and political reasons.76 
70 Nagal, Caroline: "Reconstructing space, re-creating memory: sectarian politics and urban 
development in post-war Beirut." Political Geography, 2002. 719. 
71 Barakat, 489. 
72 Shortly after the last French troops withdrew from Lebanon in 1946, more than 110,000 Palestinian 
refugees arrived in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
additional Palestinian refugees, and in 1970 thousands of Palestinian expelled militiamen from Jordan 
arrived. Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization started to attack Israel from the politically 
and militarily weak Lebanon. 
73 De Soto, H.: The Other Path: The Invisible revolution in the Third World. Harper and Row 
Publisher Inc., New York, 1989. Quoted by Soliman, 18. 
74 Soliman, 19. 
75 Barakat, 490. 
76 Soliman, 24. 
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Consequently, the social dimension gained importance on the Lebanese political map. 
Migration offered political leaders a reservoir of desperate youth becoming increasingly a 
powerful resource of violence. Michael Johnson described how political patrons utilised the 
services of their clients and in turn provided them with social services, employment and 
legal protection thus merging class domination with the confessional modes of social 
organisation.77 Still, newly arrived migrants were deprived of the political representation in 
the capital since Lebanese electoral law required everyone to vote in their place of birth.78 
As would one expect, the youth got radicalized in similar fragile conditions. The extremist 
leftists and the nationalist parties exploited fully these conditions. M. Johnson again 
provides an accurate description of this situation when he asserts that "Beirut's sectarian 
violence, then, was neither primordial, nor a rural import. For the poor it was, rather the 
outcome of confessional or 'ethnic' strategies devised to cope with social inequality under 
conditions of intense urbanisation. For the ruling elites it was a means to defend social and 
political privilege".79 ? 
Since Shiite immigrants represented largely unskilled labour, they lacked financial 
resources and remained dependent on the better-off Shiites, thus replicating the feudal 
structures of the countryside.80 A fact, that by the 1970s resulted in the formation of Musa 
Sadr's Amai movement, and later led to the birth of Hezbollah as well.81 
* 
In the southern and eastern outskirts slum like settlements evolved a process that 
affected the eastern part of Zuqaq el-Blat as well. After the independence in 1943 till the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1975 the immigration - mainly of the Shiites from South 
Lebanon and the Beqaa - accelerated, and the quarter's residential quality of life constantly 
deteriorated since no effective efforts were made to adjust urban planning and social 
housing projects corresponding to the new social reality. In the same period the historic 
fabric of Zuqaq el-Blat, more than 45 per cent of the buildings were demolished due to the 
construction of the Avenue Fouad Chéhab and the new airport road.82 The urbanisation in 
this quarter as in most parts of Beirut was essentially unplanned and as the estate surveyor 
77 Johnson, Michael: Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese 
State, 1840-1985. London, 1986. 
78 The system assigns voters to electoral districts of origin rather than residence, namely their villages 
and remote areas under sectarian control. Most voters who reside in mixed religious neighborhoods in 
Beirut or its suburbs, for example, have been forced to vote for sectarian candidates running in their 
respective villages and hometowns, their voting districts of origin. This electoral mechanism has 
weakened residential ties to the living space, establishing political alienation and a fragmented sense 
of urban identity. See: Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 248-249. 
79 History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 14. 
80 Stolleis, 181. 
81 Amai and Hezbollah are two Shiite Muslim Political movements. The former emerged in the mid-
1970s with the outbreak of the civil war, and the latter emerged in 1982 with the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. 
82 Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 82. 
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of British Embassy remarked in 1963, the neighbourhood was about to "become 
increasingly slummy".83 
The exodus of the mainly Christian upper-class inhabitants increased in the 1960s and 
continued into the civil war. Their late Ottoman mansions were neglected, transformed and 
inhabited by poor migrants. What happened in the eastern area was in sharp contrast to the 
large-scale construction works in the western part of the quarter which was near to the 
strikingly developing Ras Beirut area with its new commercial centre of Hamra. Between 
the late 1940s and the mid 1960s (till the crisis generated by the Intra Bank crash in 1966) 
high rise office buildings and blocks of flats were erected in western Zuqaq el-Blat, very 
often in the amputated gardens of the late Ottoman mansions. Two new boulevards were 
constructed in this quarter based on the master plan of 1954 and on the adopted parts of 
Écochard's Masterplan for Metropolitan Beirut 1963/64. However, the lack of investment 
security from the 1960s led to the neglect of both the implementation of the plans and the 
degradation of the existing buildings.84 Street extensions, ring roads, axes and arteries were 
created by cutting through neighbourhoods, demolishing houses and displacing inhabitants, 
thus causing considerable social friction that more and more took the form of 
intercommunal tensions.85 
3. War years and post-war reconstruction 
The continuing civil war of 1975 led to a radical change in the demographic fabric of 
Beirut's overall urban structure. The resulting population shifts and migration due to 
conflict changed the distribution of the population in and around the city radically. The 
ongoing clashes with Israel from 1972 and the two Israeli invasions (1978;1982) forced a 
large number of refugees (mostly Palestinians and Shiites living in the South) to move and 
settle in the periphery of Beirut thus transforming most of the open spaces of the southern 
suburbs into large informal areas, like the Dahiya Janubiyya (the southern suburb).86 These 
settlements were of two categories; the first, comprising various social groups of Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese people, was inside Beirut's administrative border. The second, reserved 
for Palestinians who were joined by some Lebanese families - basically residential tent-
clusters set up on land provided by the state or rented by UNRWA from private property-
was in refugees camps in Beirut's suburbs. 
Due to the multiplication of waves of internal displacement the demographic structure 
of the city of Beirut was fragmented in a multitude of confessional territories by which 
Muslims moved from Eastern Beirut to Western Beirut, and Christians moved into the 
opposite direction. As Soliman states "this reorganization of population was in line with 
ethnicity and dominated by militarization, religious ideologies, and the maintenance of 
political structures that govern through patronage, division and economic oppression".87 
83 Quoted by Bodenstein: The Making and Remaking... 36. 
84 Ibid. 82-91. 
85 History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 13. 
86 Soliman, 19. 
87 Ibid. 20. 
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After the civil war a dramatic change in the demographic urban fabric of Beirut has 
occurred. Also, the division of the city (eastern and western sectors) created new urban 
centers to meet the needs and demands of population and market mechanisms. Along the 
coastal line in the southern part of the city of Beirut, as a consequence to the multiple 
waves of war displaced persons coming from south Lebanon or the Beqaa, informal, illegal 
habitats proliferated and produced the two largest informal areas, Dahiya Janubiyya,88 and 
Dahiya Sharqyyia,89 To the north of the capital, an urgent and increasing need for lodging 
accommodation generated an unrestrained real estate speculation.90 Vacant apartments and 
sectarian neighbourhoods were occupied by the respectively evicted sectarian groups, 
known as 'al-mouhajjereen', or war displaced. As an immediate result, secular urban 
communities' neighbourhoods shrunk considerably and became occupied mostly by 
displaced families. 1 
The incursions and invasions by Israel into the largely Shiite Southern Lebanon (1993, 
1996, 2006) after the end of the civil war continued to force massive waves of Shiite rural-
to-urban displacement contributing to the further expansion of the southern suburbs of 
Beirut, at times reaching the airport's runaway.92 
The Taef agreement (1989) that maintained confessional consociationalism as the 
working formula of the Lebanese state provided a 'quick fix' rather than a sustainable 
political arrangement that could have encompassed the urban dynamics within its power-
sharing formula.93 It deliberately ignored the roots of the civil war and set about restoring 
Beirut's old financial role at the expense of the impoverished and marginalized rural and 
suburban populations. Little political efforts were invested in the return of internally 
displaced communities living on the outskirts of the Lebanese cities.94 
The post-war urban setting in many ways reinforced family ties and made them 
essential. Consensual solutions that serve the interests of the population and not that of the 
their traditional leaders have so far been impossible to find, since the 1943 National Pact, 
only sectarian communities have been allowed to become vocal and effective within the 
Lebanese polity.95 Consequently, the political leader or za 'im is playing a major role in 
shaping the built environment, preserving his socio-political and economic role in the urban 
88 Dahiya Janubiyya is divided by the north-south axis of the airport road by which two different parts 
were formulated. The eastern part combines dense old villages (Buij Al Barajneh, Mrayjeh, Harit 
Hrayk, Ghobeyri, Shiyyah) and peripheral illegal sectors (Amrusseyeh, Hay Al Sillom), while the 
western part contains major illegal sectors (Jnah, Uzai), legal low-density urbanization (Bir-hassan, 
Ramlit Al-Baydah), together with relatively large non-urbanized areas. Uzai, a liner and the largest 
illegal settlement, has been created along the axis linked Beirut and Saida. This area used to be a sea 
resort area for Greater Beirut before the civil war. (...) The southern suburb is inhabited by one third 
of population of Greater Beirut, almost 0.5 million, and occupies an area similar to that of municipal 
Beirut (respectively 16 and 17.6 square kilometres). See: Soliman, n.l. 
89 Ibid. 25. 
90 Barakat, 490. 
91 Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 248. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 246. 
94 Soliman, 20. 
95 Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 245. 
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setting.96 Within these neighbourhoods the names of streets, highways, shops, buildings, 
mosques, parks and every physical space marked with images and symbols, remind the 
onlooker of the dwellers' affiliations. "A sectarian urban demarcation reaffirms continuity 
through a strong sense of historic community and common destiny."97 This urban 
fragmentation is prevalent "in the clothes as well as in the publicity posting, the non-
conformity to religious celebrations, even sport have become a new field of 
confrontation".98 
The post-war reconstruction of the city was entrusted to a private company, Solidere 
(Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction du Centre Ville de 
Beyrouth), through a governmental decree that allowed the expropriation, reconstruction 
and management of all land in the city centre, what covers effectively the area of the "Old 
Beirut". Thus the reconstruction effort was largely focused on the city centre, in addition to 
other projects that would be of service to it, such as the airport, highways, and other 
infrastructure projects. In the last two decades Beirut has witnessed a boom in the 
demolition of historic buildings, thus giving way to the dominance of the French colonial 
style of the Mandate period and sweeping away the Ottoman legacy. Owners and tenants 
were compensated with company shares and critics were offered well-paying jobs.99 The 
expropriated landowners became mere shareholders in this new arrangement, along with 
new international investors. 
As in the case of the Maronites and the Sunni, the Shiite community developed to a 
large extent their economic, cultural, social and welfare activities within the confines of 
their confessional boundaries.100 Thus the two Shiite parties (Hezbollah and Amai) had a 
great influence in shaping Dahiya Janubiyya.101 As Helena Cobban stated, well into the 
years after 2000 it was still Hezbollah that provided drinking water, electricity and 
inevitable social services for the Dahiyeh residents despite all the rich financial sources of 
the Hariri led Lebanese governments. The significance of this phenomenon becomes clear 
when one considers that "Hizbullah's effectiveness in this sphere certainly helped build and 
buttress its political support in many parts of the country".10 
96 Soliman, 28. 
97 Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 240. 
98 Barakat, 492. 
99 History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut... 9-10. 
100 Salamey - Tabar: Consociational Democracy... 246. 
101 In addition to their political and military roles, they provide social, educational and medical 
services for Shiites and other Muslim groups inhabiting the urban areas that fall within their sphere of 
domination. A third party called the Progressive Socialist Party headed by Walid Jumblat, as a zaim 
of Druzes, played a major role on urban informality in Beirut and in the mountain of Lebanon, and he 
was later appointed as the minister of dislodged. See: Soliman, n.7. 
102 "Harik, Hamzeh, and other close observers of Hizbullah all agree that Hizbullah's social-service 
affiliates, law courts, and schools provide their services on a low-cost basis to those Lebanese who 
need them, whether Muslim or Christian, and that subsidies are available for very-low-income users. 
Many Christian parents send their children to Hizbullah-run schools, especially in south Lebanon, 
where they are often judged to provide the best education available." See: Cobban, Helena: 
"Hizbullah's New Face." Boston Review, April-May 2005. Available at: 
http://bostonreview.net/BR30.2/cobban.php 
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The spread of urban informality as the most significant phenomenon shaping the space 
and urban fabric within Beirut reached Zuqaq el-Blat as well. Like most of the periphery or 
former suburbs in Beirut, it has witnessed arbitrary residential development that caused 
(and was caused by) serious socioeconomic problems.103 
Between the mid 1970s and 1985 almost all Maronites and Jews left Zuqaq el-Blat and 
their abandoned houses were taken by Shiites, Kurds and Palestinians.104 During the civil 
strife "Palestinian and left-wing militias roamed the streets of in search of shelter and roof-
top firing positions (...)" The only way to avoid being killed or made homeless, as Khalil 
Sarkis recalls, was through emergency phone calls - begging Sunni political bosses to 
pressure military leaders to spare their old friends and neighbours. As the war dragged on, 
such lifelines of communication grew scarcer and more Zuqaqis were driven into exile. 
Members of the quarter's less fortunate minority communities were disposed to retribution. 
After Palestinians were killed and mutilated in Christian enclaves north of Beirut, 
Palestinian militias targeted defenceless victims in the easily accessible Zuqaq el-Blat.105 
During the war, in the absence of state control, in the eastern and south-eastern parts of 
the quarter low-quality high-rise blocks of flats were constructed by the new, mostly Sunni 
owners. This fact helped to minimize problems with the Muslim militias in control of the 
area. The process continued all through and after the war and later was promoted by the 
new comer Shiite developers as well, all of whom profited from the very low real-estate 
prizes in the area at that time.106 As a result, the war completely finished the destruction of 
the inherent social composition of the neighbourhood. 
The Janus-faced nature of the post war development policy is well illustrated by the fact 
that irrespective of their cultural heritage and significance, in those parts of the quarter 
outside the radius of the Beirut Central District no new construction had taken place by 
2004. While the northern segment of Zuqaq el-Blat has gradually integrated into the city's 
expanding commercial centre, its vast stretches of empty land where buildings have been 
demolished waiting for construction works or excavation to provide valuable underground 
parking, stand in sharp contrast to the rest of the quarter.107 
In our days, the neighbourhood lost all its charm and appeal, its most densely populated 
and poverty ridden areas are now inhabited by Kurds and Shiites where streets and walls 
are stuffed with the signs and emblems of the two main political parties, the Amai and the 
Hezbollah. Based on surveys and interviews, Friederike Stolleis claims that the inhabitants 
of post-war Zuqaq el-Blat are locked up in conflicting claims as to who "owns" the quarter. 
A central strategy to win supremacy - prevalent as it is in the Middle East since 1948 - is 
proving precedence in the settlement, in order to confer authority over groups who 
immigrated more recently.108 "Today, Nasif and Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Boutros and Selim 
Boustani, are still considered leading figures in the revival of Arabic literature and Syro-
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Lebanese nationalism. Yet the fertile social setting that made their cultural innovations 
possible, Zuqaq el-Blat, is all but forgotten in Lebanon and the Arab World."109 
CONCLUSION 
I intended this paper to be a contribution to the ongoing debate among historians about 
the roots of confessionalism in Lebanon. Oliver Kögler in his study about preservation of 
historic buildings in Zuqaq el-Blat argues that the battle over architectural heritage is an 
important aspect of Beirut's post-war urban development. Historic buildings are symbolic 
sites where conflicting visions of Beirut's future compete and clash with one another.110 My 
conviction is that an eventual moment and place of a non-confessional Lebanon was Zuqaq 
el-Blat in Beirut during the nineteenth century. As part of the Arab cultural and political 
renewal, it experienced a transforming mechanism which shifted its multi confessional 
inhabitants into a more inclusive political identity. Nevertheless, external factors, such as 
the French Mandate, the imposed confessionalism, the influx of Palestinian refugees and 
PLO fighters, as well as internal ones, including the social disparities between 
communities, led to continuous tensions, and ultimately to civil war. 
In the context of war and post-war, Lebanese political life has been governed by former 
war chiefs and religious leaders who make use of the social and community 
territorialisation. It is in their interest to preserve the old militia zones in the capital by 
exercising political and economical influence, and to exert control over their own 
communities. 
Al-Boustani's National School itself is the symbol of effective collaboration and 
cohabitation that took place in Beirut in the past. Today, however, amidst the astonishing 
luxury of the central districts, the school stands as an abandoned place in ruins. Can one 
hope peaceful co-existence in a country torn apart by such a composite of still bleeding 
wounds, opposing visions and clashing interests? The answer to this question proves to be 
difficult as long as no political will attempts at restoring this emblematic institution of 
national cohabitation and Lebanese solidarity. 
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